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What Loss Mitigation Taught Us About Housing Finance
Reform
From time to time, Housing Perspectives features posts by guest bloggers.
Today's post was written by Patricia McCoy, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Professor, Boston College Law School, and former Assistant Director for
Mortgage Markets, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Since 2007, the federal government and servicers have groped toward
striking the right balance between cost-effective loss mitigation and
unavoidable foreclosures for homeowners with delinquent home mortgages.
Among other things, this painful experience resulted in a cornucopia of
data about the right way and wrong way to do loss mitigation. Nevertheless, none of the leading
housing finance reform proposals has incorporated these lessons. Take, for example, the
Johnson-Crapo bill, which was the leading reform contender and made it to the Senate floor.
That bill would vaguely require servicers to establish “loss mitigation options that seek to
enhance value” but says nothing about the best way to do so. That oversight is unfortunate
because it sets us up to repeat the mistakes of the past.
First, some history. Eight years ago, the federal government became focused on foreclosure
prevention as mortgage delinquency rates began to spike. The George W. Bush Administration
sought to achieve that goal through moral suasion and voluntary compliance by servicers under
the aegis of HOPE NOW. Later, the Obama Administration turned up the heat by offering a
carrot and a stick: a carrot consisting of the HAMP Program, which paid servicers to grant loan
modifications when doing so would increase recovery, and a stick through rulemakings and
enforcement. One of the results was a rich trove of data on what makes loss mitigation work and
why.
So what did we learn? I address this question in some detail in a chapter in the Joint Center’s
latest book, Homeownership Built to Last, but here are a few quick takeaways:
1. Standardized decision tree, or “waterfall,” such as that employed by HAMP to lower
monthly payments, is key to minimizing default rates (by cutting the interest rate or, if
necessary, reducing principal).
2. Foreclosure prevention is more successful the sooner it is granted after a homeowner’s
first delinquency – ideally within two to three months.
3. The federal government should offer meaningful relief to people who are temporarily
unemployed and need help making their mortgage payments until they get back on their
feet.
These three techniques are a win-win for distressed homeowners and for investors by avoiding
needless foreclosures while maximizing investor recovery.
But there’s one final lesson that is directly relevant to housing finance reform. We can’t
implement lessons one through three unless we remove servicer barriers to effective foreclosure
prevention. In 2007 and 2008, the private-label mortgage-backed securities market collapsed and
that market remains moribund today. In the aftermath, servicers rushed to foreclosure in too
many cases, saying that pooling and servicing agreements with investors (PSAs) tied their
hands. Investors disputed those claims, complaining that the PSAs did not in fact bind servicers’
hands and that foreclosure prevention would have enhanced recovery in many of those cases. 
After that sour experience, investors will not be eager to rush back to the private-label market
unless loss mitigation rules give them stronger protections. It is important, going forward, that
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PSAs in future deals give servicers no excuse to deny loan modifications that will increase
investor recovery vis-à-vis foreclosure. Since PSAs are privately negotiated, the only real way to
assure that is to prescribe standard loss mitigation protocols and require PSAs to follow those
protocols in any housing finance reform law that Congress enacts. The protocols should require
servicers to evaluate loan modification requests by distressed borrowers using a standardized
waterfall that is designed to reduce monthly payments to an affordable target level. Under that
waterfall, servicers should attempt to attain the target payment level first through interest rate
reductions and then, if need be, through principal reductions. The statutory protocols should also
set time limits for loan modification decisions to help encourage early intervention. With these
protocols in place, we can help avoid the experience in recent years where useless foreclosures
pushed down home prices and delayed the economic recovery.
 
 Notify me
Comment as: 
 
No comments:
Post a Comment
ACS
affordability aging in place AHS baby
boom C-30
census children 
community development construction CPS
debt demographics 
distressed properties 
elderly employment energy
efficiency environment FHA
foreclosure freddie mac 
homeownership
household growth housing assistance
housing demand HUD hvs immigration
indoor air quality interest
rates investors LIRA low
income metros 
millennials minority mortgage
finance 
multifamily 
policy population growth 
public housing recession recovery
remodeling rent rental 
seniors 
state of the nation's housing student
loan 
Labels
accessible housing design 
bacteria boomerang Boston bubble 
cities climate change
disabled
DIY Dunlop echo boom
education 
equity fannie mae 
gateway cities GDP
geographic mobility GIS GSEs HAMP headship rate
healthy housing Hispanic homebuilding homeowner
counseling 
inadequate housing 
international LIHTC 
LTV marriage microbes
microbiomes 
mortgage insurance mortgage interest
deduction New Residential
Construction Surveys nonprofit overcount pathogens
price-to-income ratio
reverse
mortgage RFI SCF shared equity slums
sprawl 
substandard housing sustainability sustainable
urban development undercount urban growth urban
planning urban poverty voucher workforce housing
Tweets by @Harvard_JCHS
Blogs We Read
Zillow Blog - Real Estate Market
Stats, Celebrity Real Estate, and
Zillow News
1 hour ago
Latest Posts | The Atlantic Cities
1 hour ago
NHC Open House Blog
3 hours ago
Urban Institute MetroTrends
3 hours ago
Redfin Real Estate Blog
5 hours ago
NHI Rooflines
1 day ago
S&P HousingViews
1 day ago
Eye on Housing
3 weeks ago
NeighborWorks News
4 months ago
Economic Commentary (Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland)
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
The Stoop (Furman Center for Real
Estate and Urban Policy)
Real Estate Research (Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta)
The Demand Institute
The opinions expressed in Housing Perspectives do not necessarily represent the views of Harvard University, the Policy Advisory Board of the Joint Center for Housing Studies, or any other
sponsoring agency. The Joint Center welcomes comments to our Housing Perspectives blog. Any opinions expressed in posted comments, or in guest blogs, are those of the authors and not
those of the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University or of any of the persons or organizations providing support to the Joint Center for Housing Studies. Comments are generally
not edited but are reviewed for appropriateness, and normally post within a day. The Joint Center reserves the right to delete or decline to post comments that are off-topic, illegal, or otherwise
objectionable or injurious. Commenters are fully responsible for the content they submit, and indemnify Harvard University and the Joint Center for Housing Studies against any losses, damages,
or costs resulting from any claim relating to material they have posted. We require commenters to sign their comments with their real names. All  comments and postings are the property of the
Joint Center and may be used by the Joint Center at its discretion.
Simple template. Powered by Blogger.
